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Who Supplies America's Critical Minerals and Materials for Defense

Who produces defense-critical minerals, where China's export controls bite, and what the federal record shows DoW bought

Published · By DefDex

Intro

Who supplies America's critical minerals and materials for defense?

As of October 21, 2026, the federal record shows the United States still imports most of the minerals that defense systems depend on, and that the Pentagon's own minerals buying jumped in FY2026. DefDex built this from its supply-chain graph (inputs, producers, criticality, trade controls), USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, and obligations by product code in USAspending for DoW, DHS, DOE and NASA, FY2008 to FY2027. Every dollar below is labelled: obligated unless the text says requested, enacted or announced ceiling. A ceiling is never spending. FY2026 is partial.

Key takeaways

  • The supply risk is concentrated, not general. Of 91 material inputs in the DefDex graph, 12 are rated critical and 43 high (an editorial rating from USGS import reliance and China's share of world production). China mined 270,000 of 390,000 tons of world rare-earth oxide in 2025 and produced 99% of primary low-purity gallium (USGS, estimates).
  • DefDex holds 38 Chinese control records and two suspension deadlines are close. China suspended its October 2025 export controls (rare earths, rare-earth technology, superhard materials, lithium batteries and graphite anodes) until November 10, 2026, and suspended its ban on gallium, germanium and antimony exports to the US until November 27, 2026. The April 2025 licensing controls on seven medium and heavy rare earths are not among the suspended measures, and licensing for gallium, germanium and antimony remains.
  • Routine DoD buying of raw materials is small. Obligations under product codes 93 to 96 (materials, ores, primary metals) were $874.2 million in FY2023 to FY2025 (obligated), against $1,740 billion across the whole baseline: 0.05%.
  • FY2026 broke the pattern. Product codes 93 to 96 reached $1,262.8 million (obligated) by the partial year, against $274.5 million in FY2025. The Defense Logistics Agency's contracting office SP8000 (DLA Strategic Materials, which runs National Defense Stockpile buying) obligated $1,076.7 million, and six awards make up $850.8 million of it.
  • Ceilings dwarf spending. The 23 SP8000 vehicles active since October 2025 carry $6.31 billion in announced ceiling (potential value) and $0 obligated on the vehicles themselves. Orders under them are what count as obligations.
Small piles of rare-earth oxide powders: praseodymium, cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, samarium and gadolinium
Photo by Peggy Greb, USDA-ARS · Public domain (U.S. government work)

What This Counts

DefDex does not sort spending into sectors. It reads materials by product service code (PSC), the code on each award that says what was bought: group 93 (nonmetallic fabricated materials), 94 (nonmetallic crude materials), 95 (metal bars, sheets and shapes) and 96 (ores, minerals and primary metal forms). Chips are PSC 5961 (semiconductor devices) and 5962 (microcircuits). All totals include negative and zero actions and cover the USAspending baseline for DoW, DHS, DOE and NASA. Flood insurance (CFDA 97.022), DHS disaster assistance and other stated exclusions are separate reconciling lines.

Three limits matter. First, a product code names the item category, not the mineral: magnets bought by SP8000 in FY2026 sit under PSC 5999 and are outside 93 to 96. Second, defense systems consume most minerals inside components bought from primes, so code 93 to 96 spending is the direct purchase of materials, not the whole exposure. Third, DefDex's budget tables are empty (0 trackers, 0 figures), so there is no requested or enacted minerals series here.

Where Supply Is Concentrated

The graph links 88 companies to inputs through 161 reviewed links (produces, processes, develops, consumes) and holds 51 trade-control records. USGS figures below are 2025 estimates from the 2026 summaries, as stored with citations in DefDex.

InputWhat USGS reportsLinked producers in DefDex
Rare-earth elementsChina mined 270,000 of 390,000 t REO (2025e); refining and magnet-making are more concentrated than mining1
Dysprosium and terbiumSeparation outside China close to nil until Lynas made dysprosium oxide in Malaysia in 20254
GalliumChina 99% of primary low-purity gallium; no US primary recovery since 19879
GraphiteChina about 82% of natural graphite (2025e); US 100% import reliant1
TungstenChina 67,000 of 85,000 t (2025e); no US commercial mine since 20154
NiobiumBrazil 104,000 of 112,000 t; US reliance 100%2
TitaniumLast US sponge plant closed in 2024; reliance 100%3
CobaltDR Congo 230,000 of 310,000 t; US reliance 79%1
Ammonium perchlorateOne DoW-approved domestic source for weapons motors1

The last row shows that concentration is not only a China story. American Pacific Corporation in Cedar City is the only DoW-approved domestic source of ammonium perchlorate for weapons motors, according to the DefDex record, and is adding a line to raise capacity by more than 50%. The graph links nine companies to gallium, including Rio Tinto and Alcoa, though several are still developing supply, not producing. Of the 55 critical or high materials, 50 have a linked producer or processor and 11 have a company still developing supply. Producer links are evidence of presence, not of volume or of sales to the Pentagon.

Magnets are the clearest chain. MP Materials, Lynas Rare Earths, Energy Fuels, Ucore Rare Metals and Noveon Magnetics are linked at different steps: mine, separation, metal and alloy, magnet. USGS puts US net import reliance for rare-earth compounds and metals at 67% in 2025 (above 95% in 2021 and 2022).

What China Controls, and When It Lapses

InstrumentEffectiveInputs in DefDexStatus
MOFCOM/GAC No. 23 of 2023Aug 1, 2023gallium, germaniumLicensing in force
MOFCOM/GAC No. 39 of 2023Dec 1, 2023graphiteLicensing in force
MOFCOM/MOST No. 57 of 2023Dec 21, 2023magnet and separation technologyExport ban on technology
MOFCOM/GAC No. 33 of 2024Sep 15, 2024antimonyLicensing in force
MOFCOM No. 46 of 2024Dec 3, 2024item 2: gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard-material ban to US, stricter graphite review; item 1: no dual-use exports to US military end usersItem 2 suspended to Nov 27, 2026 (No. 72); item 1 in force
MOFCOM/GAC No. 10 of 2025Feb 4, 2025tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, indiumLicensing in force
MOFCOM/GAC No. 18 of 2025Apr 4, 2025Sm, Gd, Tb, Dy, Lu, Sc, Y and magnets containing Dy or TbIn force; not suspended
MOFCOM/GAC Nos. 55, 56, 57 and 58 of 2025announced Oct 9, 2025superhard materials; rare-earth equipment and materials; Ho, Er, Tm, Eu, Yb; lithium batteries and graphite anode materialsSuspended to Nov 10, 2026 (No. 70)
MOFCOM Nos. 61 and 62 of 2025announced Oct 9, 2025rare-earth items with extraterritorial reach (No. 61); rare-earth technologies (No. 62)Suspended to Nov 10, 2026 (No. 70)

MOFCOM Announcement No. 70 (November 7, 2025) suspended Nos. 55 to 58 and 61 and 62 from that date to November 10, 2026, and Announcement No. 72 (November 9, 2025) suspended item 2 of No. 46 to November 27, 2026. Neither names No. 18 of 2025, and a MOFCOM spokesperson restated on April 9, 2026 that the October 9, 2025 measures are suspended to November 10, 2026. No extension had been announced when this was written. On the US side, DFARS 225.7018 bars DoW from acquiring samarium-cobalt and NdFeB magnets, tantalum metals and alloys, tungsten metal powder and tungsten heavy alloy melted or produced in China, Russia, North Korea or Iran. From January 1, 2027 it extends to material mined, refined, separated, melted or produced there. DefDex does not track US tariffs, so none are discussed here.

What the Government Buys Directly

Fiscal yearPSC 93 to 96, obligatedOf which 94 and 96Chips, PSC 5961 and 5962
FY2019$243.2M$69.4M$197.9M
FY2021$176.1M$32.4M$599.1M
FY2022$268.8M$76.0M$154.9M
FY2023$249.7M$55.2M$158.2M
FY2024$350.0M$111.1M$161.8M
FY2025$274.5M$99.8M$77.2M
FY2026 (partial)$1,262.8M$1,106.8M$36.4M

FY2008 to FY2026 totals $6.07 billion for codes 93 to 96, 0.07% of the $8,677 billion non-excluded baseline. For FY2023 to FY2025 the buyers were the Defense Logistics Agency ($314.3M, 35.9%), the Army ($291.6M), the Navy ($74.6M), Citizenship and Immigration Services ($49.8M) and the Air Force ($48.1M). In FY2026 the Defense Logistics Agency holds $1,089.0 million of $1,262.8 million, 86.2%. These totals include 187 negative actions worth minus $88.0 million among 2,855 promoted actions (FY2023 to FY2026).

Chips run the other way. PSC 5961 and 5962 peaked at $599.1 million in FY2021 and are $77.2 million in FY2025. The largest recipient since FY2023 is GlobalFoundries U.S. 2 LLC at $233.2 million, with Raytheon second at $33.3 million. Product code, again, is not a measure of exposure: most chips reach DoW inside systems, not as direct purchases.

The FY2026 Jump at DLA Strategic Materials

SP8000 is DLA Strategic Materials (contracting office SP8000), the DLA office that handles National Defense Stockpile buying, research and qualification; DLA tells vendors to search SAM.gov for its DoW activity address code SP8000. USAspending's office name for the same code reads "DCSO Columbus", so these DLA Strategic Materials awards appear in USAspending under that office name. SP8000's promoted awards (those from $250,000 and up, plus reviewed and other promoted classes) reached $1,076.7 million obligated in FY2026 so far, up from $48.2 million in FY2025 and $68.8 million in FY2024.

RecipientAward description in USAspendingPSC recordedDateObligatedPotential value on the award (ceiling)
Glencore Ltd.Cobalt, delivery order 29650 nonferrous base metal refinery formsJun 29, 2026$240.3M$240.3M
Glencore Ltd.Cobalt, delivery order 19650May 15, 2026$210.3M$421.0M
ICF Mercantile LLCAerospace grade rayon fiber9420 fibers: vegetable, animal and syntheticDec 31, 2025$150.0M$150.0M
Cliffs Steel IncDomain refined grain oriented electric steel (DR-GOES)9640 iron and steel primary formsJul 1, 2026$100.0M$100.0M
CBMM North America, IncVacuum-grade ferroniobium, delivery order 29640Jul 1, 2026$90.1M$90.3M
Largo Resources USA IncVanadium pentoxide9620 minerals, natural and syntheticJul 1, 2026$60.1M$60.1M

Together these six obligations are $850.8 million, 79% of SP8000's FY2026 total. Smaller FY2026 orders went to United States Antimony Corporation (antimony metal, $30.0M and $15.4M, PSC 9630), Rio Tinto Services (scandium oxide, $24.8M twice, PSC 9650), Global Advanced Metals (niobium, $20.2M, and tantalum, $15.1M), U.S. Vanadium (vanadium pentoxide, $20.1M) and, under PSC 5999, E-VAC Magnetics and Noveon Magnetics (NdFeB magnet blocks, $12.9M each).

The vehicles behind these orders show the difference between ceiling and spending. The Glencore vehicle SP800026D0012 carries a $1.8 billion potential value and $0 obligated on the vehicle; obligations to Glencore are $450.6 million, on two orders. Rio Tinto Services and Arconic each hold $995 million vehicles; United States Antimony $245 million; ICF Mercantile and Cliffs $400 million each; Noveon and E-VAC $200 million each. All 23 add to $6.31 billion in announced ceiling. None of it is spending and none is added to the obligation figures above.

The descriptions are the free-text line each award carries in USAspending, and the product code does not always match it (the rayon fiber order sits under 9420, the electric steel under 9640). The record states what each order was for, not why DLA bought it or how much of any stockpile target it fills. Annual totals are lumpy: the two Glencore orders, six weeks apart, exceed any full prior year in the SP8000 series.

Who Produces and Who Gets Paid

The graph and the money barely overlap. Of the companies linked to a critical or high input as producer, processor or developer, only 15 show any DoW, DHS, DOE or NASA obligations in FY2023 to FY2026 on the owner company attributed to each action, and apart from $0.3 million to Northrop Grumman, only three have money in the materials product codes, all of it from SP8000: Glencore ($450.6M), Rio Tinto ($54.2M) and U.S. Vanadium ($20.1M). Noveon Magnetics shows $17.2 million over the period, $12.9 million from SP8000. Northrop Grumman's $61.9 billion is its whole federal business and appears only because the graph links it to energetic materials and rocket motors. The Glencore and Rio Tinto dollars went to separate legal entities, Glencore Ltd. (New York) and Rio Tinto Services Inc (South Jordan, Utah), so a name match to the parent company would be a guess. DefDex rolls them up only through subsidiary records on their exact SAM UEIs, with dated links based on company documents: Glencore plc's own July 3, 2018 statement names Glencore Ltd as its subsidiary, and Rio Tinto plc's 2025 Form 20-F (filed February 19, 2026) lists Rio Tinto Services Inc among its subsidiaries. Each link applies only from its start date.

Two other kinds of public money are outside this table. Announced awards under the Defense Production Act Title III program cannot be isolated in USAspending fields: for example, DefDex records a Title III Technology Investment Agreement of up to $24.8 million (a ceiling) from the Air Force Research Laboratory to Perpetua Resources for antimony permitting and construction readiness, and USGS reports a $10 million Department of War award for a Nebraska niobium-scandium-titanium project in August 2025 (announced; obligation not matched). Loans and equity are not obligations.

What This Means

Founders. The direct buyer of materials is DLA, and in 2026 it is signing vehicles for refiners and mine operators, not start-ups. Magnet and antimony producers are the exception.

Investors. Treat ceilings as option value, not revenue. SP8000 has obligated $1,076.7 million in FY2026 against $6.31 billion in vehicle ceilings.

Analysts. Compare like with like: PSC 93 to 96 obligations against USGS reliance, not against budget requests. No requested or enacted minerals series exists in DefDex yet.

BD teams. Watch November 10 and 27, 2026, the suspension end dates, and January 1, 2027, when the DFARS restriction extends to mined and refined origin.

Frequently Asked Questions

Which critical minerals does the US depend on China for?
USGS 2026 data in DefDex show China as the leading producer of gallium (99% of primary low-purity output), graphite (about 82%), tungsten (67,000 of 85,000 t), rare-earth oxide (270,000 of 390,000 t) and refined bismuth, with US import reliance of 100% for several. Brazil dominates niobium and the DR Congo cobalt.
How much does DoD spend on critical minerals?
Direct purchases under product codes 93 to 96 were $874.2 million obligated in FY2023 to FY2025 and $1,262.8 million in the partial FY2026. That excludes minerals bought inside components and systems, and magnets coded 5999.
Did the FY2026 jump come from a new program?
The data show one DLA office, SP8000, obligating $1,076.7 million in FY2026 so far, with six awards at $850.8 million, among them two cobalt orders to Glencore, aerospace-grade rayon fiber, electric steel, ferroniobium and vanadium pentoxide. DefDex does not state program intent. FY2026 is partial and will move as reporting lands.
Is an IDV ceiling money the government spent?
No. A ceiling or potential value is the most an agreement may reach. The 23 SP8000 vehicles have $6.31 billion in ceiling and $0 obligated on the vehicles; orders carry the obligations.
What happens when China's suspensions end?
The suspension of the October 2025 controls on rare earths, rare-earth technology, superhard materials, lithium batteries and graphite anodes (Announcement No. 70) runs to November 10, 2026, and the suspension of item 2 of the 2024 US-directed measure (Announcement No. 46, suspended by No. 72), which bans gallium, germanium and antimony exports to the US, to November 27, 2026. The April 2025 rare-earth licensing and ordinary licensing for the other metals stay in force, as does the bar on dual-use exports to US military end users. China may extend or let the suspensions lapse. On September 28, 2026 MOFCOM said its broader trade arrangements with the United States run to January 10, 2027, which some analysts read as a quiet extension; that statement does not name the export controls, and no announcement changing either date had been published as of October 21, 2026.
What does this data not cover?
Only DoD, DHS, DOE and NASA, FY2008 onward. It excludes loans, equity and announced deals that are not obligations, classified spending, and other agencies such as Commerce and the Treasury. Producer links show presence, not volume.
Sources & methodology